Public Health Cannot Be Reduced to 98%: Why I Stand With Tukaram Mundhe and Maharashtra FDA
- Raj Saraf
- Aug 20
- 15 min read

The Bombay High Court’s ₹5 lakh order raises a larger question: when people have been hospitalised after eating food, how much caution is “too much”?
Let me begin with the one fact that is slowly disappearing from this entire debate.
This case did not begin with a licence, a compliance form or a dispute over one mark.
It began with people falling ill.
Members of three families in Pune allegedly suffered vomiting, diarrhoea and nausea after consuming malai pedapurchased from Gurunanak Dairy and Sweets. Adults and children had to be hospitalised. Some of them reportedly required treatment in the ICU.
That is what brought the Maharashtra Food and Drug Administration into the matter. The FDA suspended the retail licence, inspected the manufacturing unit and stopped operations while samples and medical material were being examined.
Today, however, the entire public discussion has been reduced to one figure: 98% compliance.
The Bombay High Court has now lifted the suspension, permitted the shop to restart its retail business and directed the Maharashtra FDA to deposit ₹5 lakh as compensation. The Court questioned why the shop was kept closed after an FDA reinspection awarded it 35 marks out of 36. It described the continued suspension in very strong terms, while also acknowledging that the FDA’s intention was laudable.
I say this with complete respect for the Hon’ble Court: I am not comfortable with the message that is going out from this order.
If a food establishment is linked to a complaint in which several people were seriously unwell, and if the Food Safety Commissioner later says that the sample report classified the food as “unsafe”, can the entire matter be answered by saying that the premises subsequently scored 35 out of 36?
In my view, no.
At the same time, I am an advocate. I cannot ignore procedure simply because I support the purpose behind an action. If the FDA wanted to continue the suspension after the fresh inspection, it had to place the complete scientific material on record and pass a clear, reasoned order explaining why the danger still existed.
So my stand is not blind support. It is a legal stand.
The FDA was right to intervene strongly. If its later paperwork or reasoning was incomplete, that procedure should have been corrected. But the seriousness of the original public-health incident should not have been pushed into the background.
What happened in this case?
Let us first keep the dates clear.
On or around 11 June 2026, members of three Pune families allegedly fell ill after eating malai peda. The reported symptoms included vomiting, diarrhoea and nausea. Some adults and children required hospital and ICU care.
On 12 June 2026, the FDA suspended the establishment’s food licence. Its manufacturing unit was also inspected and was reportedly directed to stop work pending investigation.
Chandan Nagar Police recorded statements of the affected persons. A patient sample was reportedly sent for forensic examination, and the FDA collected food samples for analysis.
On 9 July 2026, the establishment submitted a compliance or rectification report.
On 13 July 2026, the FDA reinspected the premises and awarded 35 marks out of 36, described as approximately 98% compliance.
The suspension was not withdrawn. The establishment’s statutory appeal remained pending before the Commissioner.
On 17 August 2026, the Bombay High Court vacated the suspension, allowed the retail business to reopen and directed the FDA to deposit ₹5 lakh within 30 days. The Court also reportedly directed the authority to decide the request for removal of the “general manufacturing” category from the licence within 72 hours.
One correction is necessary because several reports and social-media posts are using the wrong expression. The licence had been suspended, not finally cancelled.
That difference matters. Suspension is preventive and temporary. Cancellation is a more permanent action and ordinarily requires a further opportunity to show cause.
What did the High Court decide?
The petition before the High Court was about the continuation of the licence suspension after the July reinspection.
The Court’s concern was understandable: if the FDA’s own officer inspected the premises, gave the establishment 35 out of 36 marks and treated the earlier defects as rectified, why was the business still closed? The department reportedly answered that the appeal was pending. The Court found that explanation unacceptable.
On that limited point, the FDA had a problem. A pending appeal is not a health reason. It is only a procedural status.
But we must be equally clear about what the High Court did not decide in this writ petition.
The Court did not conduct a criminal trial to determine:
whether the peda sold in June was legally proved to be unsafe;
whether that particular food caused the illnesses;
whether the contamination, if proved, arose during manufacturing, storage, transport or retail sale;
who was personally responsible;
what punishment should follow; or
what compensation the affected families should receive.
These issues require evidence. Laboratory reports, medical records, chain of custody, witness statements, batch details and proof of causation all matter.
Therefore, reopening the shop cannot be treated as a clean chit regarding the June incident.
A business may correct its premises and become fit to operate in the future. That does not erase a possible offence committed in the past. Both statements can be true at the same time.
Is 98% compliance a rule under food-safety law?
No.
There is no section in the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 which says that once a shop reaches 98%, its suspension must automatically be revoked.
There is also no section saying that every food establishment must score a mathematical 100% before it can operate.
That is why percentages alone can mislead.
Suppose the missing two per cent relates to the colour of a record book or a licence category. That is very different from a missing requirement concerning refrigeration, pest control, contaminated water or the storage of milk products.
The correct question is not simply, “How many marks did the shop receive?”
The correct questions are:
What exactly was not complied with?
Was the remaining issue administrative or connected with health and hygiene?
Were all the serious defects found during the first inspection removed?
Was the food batch connected with the illness traced and scientifically examined?
Was the manufacturing source cleared?
Could a limited restriction protect the public, or was complete closure still necessary?
The reported case note suggests that the substantive deficiencies were treated as rectified and that the remaining issue involved removing the “general manufacturing” category because the petitioner proposed to operate only as a retailer. If that is the full factual position, it would not be fair to call the missing one mark a dangerous hygiene failure without seeing the actual checklist.
I accept that.
But the reverse is also true. A 98% inspection score cannot answer an unsafe-food report. One document examines the condition of the establishment on the date of reinspection. The other concerns the safety of food that had already been manufactured, stored or sold.
These are separate questions. Why are we treating them as one?
My position is simple: after a serious food-poisoning complaint, every critical health defect and every risk connected with the suspected product must be fully addressed before unrestricted operations resume. I am not inventing a “1000%” legal score. I am saying that where human life is concerned, no critical failure can be waved away as a small percentage.
Was the FDA required to give more time instead of suspending the licence?
This is another point on which the law is being discussed only halfway.
Section 32 of the Food Safety and Standards Act provides the normal improvement-notice procedure. The notice must state the violations, specify what has to be corrected and ordinarily give at least 14 days for compliance.
If the food business does not comply, its licence may be suspended. Continued failure can eventually lead to cancellation after an opportunity to show cause.
But Section 32 also contains an important public-health exception. The Designated Officer may suspend a licence immediately in the interest of public health, provided the reasons are recorded in writing.
Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the FDA could never act immediately and was legally bound to give another two weeks even when people had reportedly been hospitalised.
What should an authority do in such a situation? Wait for one more family to fall sick before taking preventive action?
The law does not require that.
In my assessment, the initial suspension had a proper statutory foundation if the public-health reasons were recorded in writing. The real difficulty arose later, after the 13 July reinspection.
If the FDA believed that reopening was still unsafe, it should immediately have passed a fresh and detailed order. That order should have stated:
what risk continued to exist;
whether the remaining deficiency was critical;
what the laboratory report showed;
whether the retail outlet and manufacturing unit presented different risks;
why a restriction only on the suspected product would not be sufficient; and
when the position would be reviewed again.
The department apparently placed greater reliance before the Court on the fact that the appeal was pending. Legally, that was not enough.
Do I therefore believe the FDA’s original action was wrong? No.
Do I believe the continued action required a better speaking order and stronger presentation before the Court? Yes.
That is the honest legal position.
Public health and proportionality must operate together
Section 18 of the Food Safety and Standards Act gives us the correct balance.
The law tells authorities to protect human life and health. It also permits provisional measures where available information indicates possible harm, even though complete scientific certainty has not yet arrived.
In simple words, the State does not have to remain helpless until every laboratory and court proceeding is complete. It may take precautions where the risk is genuine.
However, such restrictions cannot continue mechanically. They must be proportionate, should not restrict trade more than necessary, and must be reviewed within a reasonable time.
This is exactly how the present matter should have been approached.
The reported hospitalisations justified caution. The later repairs required review. The alleged unsafe report required scientific attention. And the final decision—whether to reopen fully, reopen conditionally or keep a particular product stopped—required recorded reasons.
The Constitution also protects both sides.
The establishment has a right to carry on business under Article 19(1)(g), subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(6). Consumers have the right to life and health under Article 21.
Food business is not an ordinary trade where a defect affects only the buyer’s pocket. A serious defect can affect a child’s health within hours. That is why the licence carries duties along with rights.
What about the families who allegedly fell ill?
This is where I have my greatest concern.
According to the affected families, they had eaten food prepared separately in their own homes. The peda was said to be the common outside item consumed by those who later became unwell. A 14-year-old boy and a nine-year-old child were among those reportedly admitted to intensive care.
These allegations have to be proved. The establishment is entitled to defend itself, challenge the sample and contest causation. I am not declaring anybody guilty through a blog.
But should the victims disappear from the public conversation merely because the shop later renovated or corrected its premises?
Certainly not.
Section 26 places responsibility upon a food business operator to ensure food safety at every stage under its control. It prohibits the manufacture, storage, distribution or sale of unsafe food.
The law goes further. Where unsafe food is part of a batch or lot, the rest of that batch may also be presumed unsafe unless a detailed assessment shows otherwise. The authority may restrict or withdraw food even where there is apparent technical conformity, provided it records reasons to suspect that the food is unsafe.
This is why the investigation must examine more than the cleanliness of the shop on 13 July. It should examine:
the batch from which the peda came;
where it was manufactured;
the milk and other ingredients used;
storage temperature and cold-chain records;
purchase and sale invoices;
expiry and traceability records;
whether the remaining stock was recalled or destroyed; and
whether the medical and food samples support a common source of infection.
That is the real public-health inquiry.
The ₹5 lakh direction: what was the loss calculation?
First, this was not a personal fine imposed upon Tukaram Mundhe.
The reported order directs the Maharashtra FDA, as an institution, to deposit ₹5 lakh as compensation for the business. Calling it a personal penalty on the Commissioner is factually incorrect.
Second, the public reports indicate how the shop presented its loss.
Its advocate reportedly stated that the establishment earned around ₹25,000 per day and remained closed for approximately 34 days after the favourable reinspection.
The arithmetic is straightforward:
₹25,000 × 34 days = ₹8.5 lakh.
The Court awarded ₹5 lakh.
This means that the first period—from the original suspension until the establishment submitted compliance and was reinspected—does not appear to have been included in the 34-day calculation. In other words, the period required for correction of the original deficiencies was apparently excluded. The claim was based on the period after the 13 July inspection.
That answers one part of the issue.
But another question remains: was ₹25,000 the daily sale or the daily profit?
These are not the same.
If a shop has sales of ₹25,000, it still has to pay for raw material, stock, employees, electricity, rent, taxes and several other costs. Some costs may continue during closure; others may be saved. Actual business loss ordinarily requires accounts, tax records, bank entries, previous sales and net-margin calculations.
From the publicly reported material, it is not clear whether such a detailed exercise took place. The ₹5 lakh amount appears to be an ad hoc compensatory figure based upon the asserted revenue loss.
The High Court has wide powers under Article 226, and an arbitrary State action can certainly justify relief. But where public money is used to compensate commercial loss, the method should be transparent. What documents were examined? What was the net loss? Was mitigation considered? Why was ₹5 lakh selected instead of some other amount?
These are fair appellate questions. Asking them is not disrespectful to the Court.
What did Tukaram Mundhe say after the order?
Mundhe did not withdraw his stand. He said that the order was surprising, that the written order would be examined and that the FDA would consider its legal options.
More importantly, he referred to two facts: people had been hospitalised, and the test report had classified the food as unsafe.
His essential response was:
“It was a case of food poisoning … the report is ‘unsafe’. So, the action we took was correct.”
That statement does not by itself prove the case against the establishment. The analyst’s report, sampling procedure and causal evidence must all withstand legal scrutiny.
But neither can the statement be ignored. If an unsafe report exists, it should be placed before the appropriate court and the statutory prosecution process should move without delay.
As of 20 August 2026, I have not found a publicly verifiable appeal number or a stay against the High Court order. It is therefore safer and factually correct to say that the FDA announced its intention to examine further legal remedies.
Reopening does not close the other legal proceedings
This is perhaps the most important legal clarification.
The licence case concerned whether the business could continue to operate. The case concerning the allegedly unsafe food deals with responsibility for the June incident. One does not automatically finish the other.
Legal track | What it decides | Position after reopening |
Licence proceeding | Whether the establishment may presently operate | Suspension vacated by the High Court |
Unsafe-food prosecution | Whether unsafe food was manufactured, stored or sold and whether it caused injury | Can proceed independently, subject to evidence and sanction |
Hygiene adjudication | Whether statutory hygiene or regulatory directions were violated | Can continue as a separate penalty proceeding |
Victim compensation | Whether affected consumers are entitled to compensation | Rights may be pursued under the FSS Act and consumer law |
Police investigation | Whether any offence is disclosed under the applicable criminal law | Depends upon laboratory, medical and investigative evidence |
Unsafe-food prosecution
Section 42 lays down the prosecution process. The Food Safety Officer collects the sample and sends it to the Food Analyst. The Designated Officer examines the report and decides whether the contravention is punishable only with a fine or also with imprisonment. Where imprisonment is involved, the matter goes to the Commissioner for sanction and for a decision on the proper court.
If the food is legally proved to be unsafe, Section 59 provides punishment according to the harm caused:
Result of the unsafe food | Punishment under Section 59 |
No injury | Imprisonment up to 6 months and fine up to ₹1 lakh |
Non-grievous injury | Imprisonment up to 1 year and fine up to ₹3 lakh |
Grievous injury | Imprisonment up to 6 years and fine up to ₹5 lakh |
Death | Imprisonment from 7 years up to life, and fine of at least ₹10 lakh |
ICU admission shows that the matter may be serious, but it does not automatically establish “grievous injury” in law. Medical evidence and the statutory legal test will decide that question.
Hygiene and other regulatory penalties
Separate action may also arise from the conditions found during inspection.
Section 55 permits a penalty up to ₹2 lakh for failure to comply with a lawful direction of the Food Safety Officer. Section 56 permits a penalty up to ₹1 lakh where food is manufactured or processed under unhygienic or unsanitary conditions. Fine-only contraventions are ordinarily considered by the Adjudicating Officer.
Compensation for the consumers
Section 65 is meant for the people who suffer injury or death because of unsafe food. It permits:
compensation of at least ₹5 lakh in case of death;
compensation up to ₹3 lakh for grievous injury; and
compensation up to ₹1 lakh for other injury.
The section says compensation should be paid at the earliest and not later than six months from the incident. In serious cases, the competent authority or court may also order recall, licence cancellation, forfeiture or prohibition.
The affected consumers may separately examine remedies under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, including compensation for injury and an appropriate product-liability claim. Every such proceeding will, of course, depend upon proof.
Why was there urgency for the business but no similar direction for the victims?
I understand the legal answer. The High Court was hearing the licence petition filed by the business. The affected families may not have been parties before the Bench. A writ court cannot convict an establishment or decide victim compensation without the proper pleadings and evidence.
Still, one cannot ignore the contrast.
The licence-related request received a 72-hour direction. The FDA was given 30 days to deposit ₹5 lakh. But the publicly reported order contains no similar timetable for completion of the unsafe-food process or for consideration of compensation to the affected families.
For an ordinary citizen looking at the matter, what impression does this create?
The shop’s financial loss is immediately measurable. The family’s hospitalisation, medical expenses, lost working days and trauma remain somewhere in another file.
That is not how public-health justice should appear.
Section 42 already provides time-bound stages for analysis and prosecution decisions. Section 74 permits Special Courts for serious cases involving grievous injury or death where the prescribed sentence exceeds three years. The State should disclose, subject to lawful privacy safeguards, what stage the investigation has reached and what has been done for the affected consumers.
Where I differ with the Court—and where the FDA must accept its mistake
Let me state both parts plainly.
I respectfully disagree with any general suggestion that continuing concern after “98% compliance” is necessarily perverse. In food safety, the nature of the missing requirement and the scientific evidence are more important than the headline percentage.
I also believe the alleged unsafe report and the hospitalisations deserved fuller attention while considering whether an unconditional reopening was appropriate.
The ₹5 lakh commercial compensation, based on the publicly reported revenue claim, requires a clearer calculation. Gross receipts cannot automatically be treated as actual loss.
However, the FDA must also accept where its case became weak.
After receiving the reinspection report, it should not have allowed the matter to remain trapped in an internal appeal. It should have decided quickly. If the risk continued, it should have issued a fresh speaking order supported by the analyst’s report, medical material and a clear assessment of the current danger.
The department should also have separated the legal position of the retail shop from that of the manufacturing activity. If only one product or one manufacturing source remained under suspicion, the authority had to explain why a narrower restriction was insufficient.
This was the procedural gap.
It does not show that Mundhe’s concern for public health was wrong. It shows that an officer taking a strong stand must be supported by equally strong files, reasons and legal drafting.
In court, intention is not enough. The record must speak.
What could a balanced solution have looked like?
The law did not require a choice between completely shutting the business forever and reopening everything without conditions.
A balanced order could have:
permitted retail operations after confirming that every critical premises-related defect was cured;
continued the stop on manufacturing or selling the suspected product until scientific clearance;
required batch records, ingredient traceability and recall compliance;
directed surprise inspections and additional sampling for a fixed period;
ordered the FDA to take its prosecution decision within a specified time;
expressly preserved the affected consumers’ rights under Section 65 and the Consumer Protection Act; and
considered commercial compensation only after examining audited evidence of actual loss.
That approach would protect business rights without weakening food safety. It would also send the correct message: a shop may become fit to reopen, but reopening does not wipe out responsibility for an earlier incident if that responsibility is ultimately proved.
A question for Maharashtra: why was strict enforcement not normal earlier?
There is another question which nobody should avoid.
Maharashtra did not suddenly discover unhygienic kitchens, poor storage, adulteration and food-safety violations in 2026. Citizens have complained about these issues for years.
Then why does strict action appear extraordinary whenever an officer actually enforces the law?
Why was this not the normal approach of the department earlier?
My support for Tukaram Mundhe comes from this point. An administrator who is willing to confront large establishments, popular outlets and organised commercial interests should not be discouraged merely because the action causes inconvenience to a business.
At the same time, enforcement cannot depend upon one officer forever. It must become part of the institution.
Maharashtra needs regular risk-based inspections, sufficient Food Safety Officers, faster accredited laboratories, digital checklists that distinguish critical from minor defects, fixed reinspection timelines and public information about samples, unsafe findings, prosecutions and victim compensation.
There should be accountability in both directions: for an officer who acts carelessly, and also for an officer who ignores a danger.
My final view
I stand with Tukaram Mundhe and the Maharashtra FDA on the need for uncompromising food-safety enforcement.
The initial action followed a serious complaint involving hospitalisation. The law allowed immediate suspension in the interest of public health, subject to written reasons. Mundhe has also stated publicly that the sample report was unsafe.
At the same time, I cannot say that 98% automatically means the shop had to remain closed. The remaining parameter had to be identified. After reinspection, the FDA needed a fresh, well-reasoned and proportionate order. If it did not produce one, that was a procedural lapse and should be corrected.
But was ₹5 lakh from public funds the proper response? Was gross revenue the right basis? Was the unsafe report adequately considered? And, most importantly, where is the same urgency for the families who allegedly suffered?
These questions remain.
This is not an attack on the judiciary. Courts must control arbitrary State action. But judicial scrutiny should not result in a situation where sincere public-health enforcement begins to look like the greater wrong, while the incident that brought children to an ICU becomes secondary.
Food safety is not paperwork. It is not a public-relations exercise. And it is certainly not only a percentage on an inspection sheet.
It concerns the food placed before our children and families every day.
The law may correct an officer’s procedure. It should not weaken his courage to protect the public.
That is why my stand is firm: pro-consumer, pro-accountability and pro-life.



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